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What's Fair in Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-national
Perspectives from Survey Evidence
Marsha Garrison*

[Wihen love has vanished,there's only money left to divide ...

.1

Americans are more likely to experience divorce than any other
type of civil litigation.2 Nearly half of American marriages end in
divorce, with the result that more than a million divorces are
concluded in the United States each and every year.
Since the advent of no-fault divorce in the 1960s and 1970s,
both divorce litigation and negotiation have focused predominantly
on the distribution of property and debt. Many divorcing couples
do not have minor children, and spousal support is today awarded
only rarely.4 But virtually all divorcing couples have debts, and
most have assets.
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1. MARCIA MILLMAN, WARM HEARTS AND COLD CASH: THE INTIMATE

DYNAMICS OF FAMILIES AND MONEY 11 (1991).
2. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
1093, 1116 (1988) ("Divorce and its incidents are, for most disputants, the only
occasion on which they will come into contact with the law in a formal sense.");
see also Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What's Needed and What's Not,
27 PACE L. REv. 921, 922 n.3 (2007) (reporting that 75% of N.Y. court filings
are divorce actions, a figure that does not include uncontested divorces).
3. See Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for
2009, 58 NAT'L VITAL STAT. RPTS. 25, tbl. 2 (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_25.pdf
4. Data on overall alimony rates are sparse. See Juliet Behrens & Bruce
Smyth, Spousal Support in Australia: A Study of Incidence and Attitudes 10
(Austl. Inst. Fam. Stud., Working Paper No. 16, 1999) (reporting that 7% of
Australian divorce sample had received or paid spousal support); Margaret F.
Brinig, Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements, 1 REv. L. &
EcoN. 241 (2005) (reporting 7-9% alimony rate in Iowa divorce sample and
finding that all alimony awards were short-term). In the U.K., one survey found
that only 31% of divorced women with children received any form of
maintenance-child support or alimony-from a former husband. See Stephen
P. Jenkins, MaritalSplits andIncome Changes Over the Longer Term 13, tbl. 3,
(Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research, Univ. of Essex, Working paper No. 2008-07,
2008). At least in the United States, the low incidence of alimony awards has
been fairly constant over the long term. 15-17% of surveyed divorced women
reported to the U.S. Census Bureau that they had been awarded alimony from
the late 1970s through 1989, the last full year the Census Bureau collected
alimony data. GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989, Current Pop. Rpts., Series P-60, No. 173 at 12
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All divorce property-distribution systems aim to achieve a fair
division of spousal assets. However, no consensus has emerged as
to either the pool of assets available for division or the correct
divisional principle. Property distribution schemes are highly
divergent in the United States and abroad.
Because of variation in property-division schemes, the same
divorcing spouse might receive a dramatically different property
award depending on the jurisdiction in which the divorce takes
place. Suppose, for example, that Husband and Wife divorce in
California. Further assume that, after a 20-year marriage, Husband
and Wife have accumulated $200,000 in assets acquired during the
marriage from employment income and that Husband has inherited
assets worth $500,000. Under California's property-division rules,
Husband would retain his $500,000 inheritance; both Husband and
Wife would receive half ($100,000) of the assets derived from
marital employment.6 But, should Husband and Wife divorce in
Vermont, Husband's inheritance would be included within the pool
of distributable assets. Because each spouse's property award is
discretionary, Wife might receive half of the 7total ($300,000); she
might receive less, or she might receive more.
Which, if either, of these very different distributional schemes
best comports with spousal expectations and popular notions of
fairness? It seems unlikely that the expectations of married couples
vary dramatically from one state to the next. Nor is there any
reason to suppose that what is fair in California would dramatically
differ from what is fair in Vermont.
For the past 40 years, all commentators have agreed that the
basic goal of divorce property distribution is fairness. They have
also assumed that the ideal of marital partnership precludes
exclusive reliance on title as a basis for determining who gets

(1990). U.S. census data from the turn of the century indicate that 9.3% of
divorces included alimony awards. See PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127-28 (1959). The typical alimony recipient is longmarried and has a very low income in relation to that of her spouse. See Behrens
& Smyth, supra (all alimony recipients had been in relatively long marriages);
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical
Analysis of DiscretionaryDecision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 468-69, tbls.
14-16 (1996); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of
New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L.
REV. 621, 711, tbl. 48 (1991).
5. See Garrison,supra note 2, at nn. 5-12 (describing research on property
and debt holdings of divorcing couples).
6. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West Supp. 2011).
7. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (West, Westlaw through law No. 46 of
the 2011-2012 session of the Vermont General Assembly (2011)).
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what. But, beyond these basics, commentators tend to offer
conclusions based on assertion instead of empirical or theoretical
evidence. The American Law Institute (ALI), for example, asserts:
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not
think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if
they would be so classified under the technical property
rules. Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that
such assets will be available to provide for their joint
retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse, or for other
personal emergencies. The longer the marriage the more
likely it is that the spouses will have made decisions about
their employment or the use of their marital assets that are
premised in part on such expectations about the separate
property of both spouses. If the marriage ends with the
death of the wealthier spouse, the common law has
traditionally provided the remedy of a forced share for
survivors not otherwise provided for .... The [proposed]
rule . . . [requires] spouses who live together for many

years [to] commit at least some of their [separate-property]
resources to one another, in a proportion that increases with
the duration of their relationship, unless there is good
reason to think that they did not intend that result. This is
surely more reasonable than assuming that spouses who
live together for many years do not intend to commit any of
their resources to one another.8
In this explanation of its rule choice, the ALI makes factual
assumptions about spousal expectations and behavior. The ALI
also assumes that the justifications underlying rules applicable to
property distribution at death provide an appropriate model for
property distribution at divorce. But the ALI offers no empirical
evidence for its factual claims, nor does it offer any factual or
policy justifications to support its reliance on probate law. I do not
mean to single out the ALI; other analysts have also been long on
assertion and short on both empirical and theoretical evidence.
This article presents cross-national survey evidence on
property distribution at divorce. Although the sample is not
representative of the population as a whole, it does shed light on
8. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 4.12 cmt. a (2002)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
9. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage,
104 COLuM. L. REv. 75 (2004); Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love:
Reconsideringthe Sanctity ofSeparateProperty, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1623 (2008).
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how young, well-educated adults perceive fairness in property
distribution and how they respond to both the classic definitions of
property available for divorce distribution and newer schemes like
that proposed by the ALL. Part One explains current distribution
models, their origins, and why there is no obvious choice between
them. Part Two describes the survey evidence, analyzes its
implications, and charts an agenda for further research.
I. PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION AT DIVORCE: METHODS AND MODELS
Each divorce-property distribution scheme must resolve two
basic questions. What assets are available for distribution? What
principle shall determine the division of that asset pool?
A. What Assets Are Distributableat Divorce?
1. The DefinitionalApproaches
There are two primary approaches to defining the pool of assets
available for distribution at divorce. Most American jurisdictions,
and a majority of European nations, permit the divorce court to
divide only community or marital assets.' 0 Under this approach,
which I will call the "marital model," assets a spouse acquires
before marriage and assets a spouse acquires during marriage
through gift, descent, or device cannot be distributed to the spouse
who does not hold legal title. A minority approach, which I will
call the "universal model," permits the divorce court to divide all
assets owned by either spouse, without regard to when and how
those assets were acquired."
In addition to these two primary definitional models, there are
also hybrid systems. For example, the ALI has proposed that a
combination of the universal and marital models should govern
divorce property distribution. The ALI's proposal bears a strong
THE
DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
OLDHAM,
10. See J. THOMAS
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 3.03 (2005); EUROPEAN COMMISSION GENERAL
DIRECTION JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS UNIT, STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW ON
THE RULES GOVERNING CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION AND LAWS ON
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES AND THE IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR PROPERTY
ISSUES OF THE SEPARATION OF UNMARRIED COUPLES IN THE MEMBER STATES

(2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/regimes/
report regimes_030703_fr.pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION STUDY].

11. See OLDHAM, supra note 10, at § 3.03 n.3 (listing American
jurisdictions following the universal approach). European jurisdictions following
the universal approach include the Netherlands. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION
STUDY, supra note 10.
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resemblance to the 1990-93 Uniform Probate Code approach to
the determination of a surviving spouse's right to elect against a
decedent spouse's will.12 Under this proposal, a varying percentage
of nonmarital assets is added to the pool of distributable marital
assets; the percentage increases with marital duration. Thus, at the
beginning of a marriage, the ALI approach requires use of the
marital model, while in a long marriage it requires use of the
universal approach.13 Although no state has adopted the ALI
proposal, there are a number of jurisdictions that authorize a court
to divide some or all nonmarital assets in special circumstances.
In many cases, the definition of divisible assets will not play a
major role in determining divorce outcomes. If a couple marries
when they are young, it is unlikely that either will have acquired
many valuable assets. Unless one or the other comes from a
wealthy family, gifts, bequests, and inheritances are unlikely to
play a major role in the couple's financial expectations or
planning. In such a case, the asset pool available for distribution of
divorce property will be the same no matter which definitional
approach-community, universal or ALI-we employ.
In some cases, however, the definition of divisible assets
matters. Consider this case:
Hal and Wanda have been married for 30 years. They
own the following assets, all acquired during their marriage
with employment income:
1. The marital home, owned jointly, valued at $500,000;
2. Wanda's pension, owned by Wanda, worth $1 million;
3. Hal's pension, owned by Hal, worth $100,000.
Hal also owns a stock portfolio that he inherited from his
grandmother before marriage. The portfolio was worth $300,000
when Hal and Wanda married, and it is worth $1.5 million now.
Hal made few pension contributions during the marriage because
he viewed this inheritance as a retirement nest egg.
In the case of Hal and Wanda, the community model produces
a pool of divisible assets limited to $1.6 million consisting of the
marital home and the pensions owned by Wanda and Hal. The
universal model produces an asset pool worth $3.1 millionalmost twice the marital model value-because it requires
inclusion of Hal's inherited stock portfolio; indeed, the universal
model would require inclusion of Hal's inheritance even if Hal and
Wanda's marriage terminated three years after it took place instead
of 30. The ALI model requires the inclusion of Hal's inheritance
because Hal and Wanda have been married for a long time, but
12.
13.

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-202 (2008).
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 4.12.
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none or a very limited portion of the inheritance would have been
included in the pool of divisible assets if their marriage had been
brief.
2. Defining Property,Defining Marriage
So, what is the optimal definition of divisible property? Should
a divorce court treat Hal's inheritance as a divisible asset in some
or all cases? Should it matter if Hal and Wanda have been married
for a long time? Should it matter if, as in the case of Hal and
Wanda, the evidence shows that one or both spouses have made
financial decisions based on the existence of this asset?
There is no obvious right answer to any of these questions. The
definition of divisible property, like the notion of property in
general, is a contested concept:
There is no inevitable content to property, and the choice
among its competing configurations entails significant
distributive consequences: each additional stick in the
owner's bundle of rights, and any expansion of an existing
stick, is ipso facto a burden on non-owners. Thus, no
arbitration among the different available conceptions of
property is possible without some normative apparatus.14
Any normative apparatus used to define the pool of property
divisible at divorce will reflect prevailing conceptions of marriage
and spousal status. Thus, the common law, which reflected a
patriarchal vision of marriage under which husband and wife were
one legal person,' 5 treated a husband as owner of all personal
property that his wife brought into the marriage or acquired during
it. 1 Although any real property a wife brought into the marriage
did revert to her upon her husband's death, the use, rents, and
profits of such property belonged to her husband throughout the
marriage.' 7 A wife who survived her husband had a "dower"
entitlement, consisting of a life estate in one-third of real property
that her husband held in fee at any time during the marriage, but

14. Hanoch Dagan, Values: The Limited Autonomy of PrivateLaw, 56 AM.
J. Comp. L. 809, 814-15 (2008).
15. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 256 (William C. Sprague ed.,
9th ed. 1915).
16. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 219-20
(1968). The wife's "paraphernalia," i.e., clothing and jewelry, did revert to the
wife upon her husband's death. See id.
17. See id. at 220.
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she had no right to inherit any of his assets.'8 Nor could a wife,
through divorce, claim any share of her husband's assets or recover
those she had brought into the marriage.
Through the innovation of the trust, the chancery courts did
develop doctrines that permitted individuals who wanted to benefit
a married woman to get around the common law rules. But these
trust doctrines were available only when a wife had a benefactor
who clearly specified that she was the intended beneficiary of the
property conveyed; for example, a father whose daughter had
married a spendthrift could use trust law to ensure that the
daughter's husband could not reach certain assets and thus ensure
her support. But a wife without such a benefactor could not rely on
trust doctrine to protect herself.
During the 19th century, this patriarchal conception of
marriage gave way to a more individualistic model. The husband
was still the household head; he determined the family's domicile
and maintained the right to discipline his wife as well as his
children. But the wife now had her separate sphere; she could
retain title to property she brought into the marriage and that which
she acquired during it. She could also divorce her husband if she
could show that he was at fault in causing the dissolution of the
relationship. In such a case, the new divorce laws permitted a court
to award her child support until the children of the marriage came
of age and spousal support (alimony) for her own needs until her
death or remarriage. These new divorce remedies were widely seen
as compensation for the virtuous wife and mother and punishment
for the guilty husband and father. 19 They did not, however, permit
a divorced wife to obtain any share of assets held by her husband
in his name.

18. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 475-76
(8th ed. 2009) (describing dower system).
19. Divorce remedies also served to protect the public against the specter of
welfare dependency. Early divorce law and early public assistance schemes thus
utilized similar eligibility criteria that focused on both dependence and
blameworthiness. Public benefits were available only to the "worthy" poor, a
group that excluded the wife who had abandoned a husband without good cause.
Even the mother's pension movement of the early twentieth century extended
welfare benefits only to widowed or abandoned mothers of young children. See
2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 348-97

(Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971) (quoting extensively from contemporary
accounts of the mother's pension movement). For analyses of nineteenth century
views on the link between poverty and morality, see GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB,
THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE (1983) and

Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transitionfrom Laissez-Faire
to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
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Lest one imagine that divorce property distribution rules map
neatly onto a prevailing conception of marriage, it is important to
note that the civil law countries of Europe, which held equally
patriarchal views of marriage and family relationships, 20 typical
followed a very different approach to spousal property rights.
Under the "community property" or "community of acquests"
system, property acquired during the marriage as a result of spousal
effort was viewed as an asset of the marriage, without regard to title.
To some extent, this view of marital property rights reflects the fact
that into the "nineteenth century . .. the married couple. . . formed a

working unit. In these circumstances, economic cooperation was an
essential aspect of marital relations . . . [and] a major element in

spouse selection." 22 Under the community property model,
management rights went to the husband,2 3 but both spouses held an
indefeasible and equal interest in the community assets.
Not only did the community model flourish in many parts of
Europe during the same era that the common law accorded wives no
marital property rights whatsoever, but European marital-property
law reveals a patchwork of rules even within a single geographic
area. For example, in parts of Lower Austria, the prevailing concept
of marital property, or Giltergemeinschaft,held that all property that
accrued to the spouses during their marriage formed a common
matrimonial pool of wealth, ein gemeinschaftliches Gut. The
surviving spouse-whether male or female-inherited half of the
property and the other half was divided among the children. But, in
the Innichen area, a separate property regime and primogeniture
prevailed. Under this system, a wife typically retained a right of
20. See RUDOLF HUBNER ET AL., A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW
617-18 (1918) (noting that "[t]he husband, in the patriarchal family law of the
prehistoric Indo-Germanic period, enjoyed in the marriage a position so superior
to that of woman that language had no word for the conceptions 'marriage,'
'spouses,' or 'parents.' Similarly, the mundium of the old Germanic law still
involved a subjection of the bride to the unlimited power of the man to whom
she was given in marriage.").
21. See generally MARTHA C. HOWELL, THE MARRIAGE EXCHANGE:
PROPERTY, SOCIAL PLACE, AND GENDER INCITIES OF THE Low COUNTRIES, 13001550 (1998) (describing the shift from a marital property regime based on custom
to one based on contract: in the former, a widow typically inherited her husband's
property; in the latter, she shared it with or simply held it for his family or
offspring); TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: MARRYING AND ITS DOCUMENTATION IN
WESTERN CHRISTENDOM, 400-1600 (Philip L. Reynolds & John Witte, Jr. eds.,
2007).
22. Josef Ehmer, Marriage, in THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN FAMILY:
FAMILY LIFE IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, 1789-1913, at 298 (David I.
Kertzer & Marzio Barbagli eds., 2002).
23. See id at 286-87.
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possession (similar to the common law dower right) but no vested
interests in the marital wealth.24
Why did these very different systems develop? One factor that
explains regional differences is inheritance law. The common law
system, which gave wives no property rights, was coupled with
primogeniture. Inheritance law and matrimonial law thus worked
hand in hand to ensure that landed estates were not broken up and
remained within the same family line. 25 The community property
system, on the other hand, was typically coupled with inheritance
rules that gave surviving children (or at least male children) equal
entitlements.
A second factor was economic organization. To oversimplify,
the common law system served the interests of the (male) landed
gentry; the community property system tended to favor the
interests of artisans and the peasantry. Thus, 17th and 18th century
legal reforms in Austria that "were aimed against . .. joint marital
property" were, in some areas, effectively overruled by marriage
contracts that preserved the older tradition:
[T]his [new] system ... was not ... in any way compatible
with peasant society. It negated the economic unity of the
typical farm, as well as the reality of the "working team" of
husband and wife, who with equal contributions-and in
some respects, equal rights-conducted their mutual
economic activities. Joint marital property as a form
detailed by marriage contracts persisted, uninfluenced by
legal innovations, into the 20th century. 26
In sum, marital property law has invariably reflected prevailing
views of both marriage and forms of economic organization. 27
This historical detour does not tell us what system of divorce
property distribution is best today, but it does tell us that a
successful system will be compatible with prevailing marital ideals
and economic realities.
24. See Gertrude Langer-Ostrawsky & Margareth Lanzinger, More Favored
-Less Favored? Women and Men in Diferent MaritalPropertyRight Systems:
A ComparativeStudy of MaritalPropertyRights in the HabsburgEmpire during
the 18th Century, in LESS FAVORED-MORE FAVORED: PROCEEDINGS FROM A
CONFERENCE

ON

GENDER

IN EUROPEAN

LEGAL

HISTORY,

12TH-19TH

CENTURIEs (2004).
25. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 469-70.
26. Langer-Ostrawsky & Lanzinger, supranote 24.
27. Other factors-cultural norms, legal norms, local traditionsundoubtedly have played a role in determining which systems have remained in
place, as has the capacity of individuals to avoid or contract out of the prevailing
regime. When legal rules that do not comport with perceived needs can easily be
evaded, there is less pressure to replace them.
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3. Partnershipand Equality: The New MaritalIdeals

Today, both patriarchy and the separate-sphere conception of
spousal relations have given way to an equality ideal. Almost
everywhere, marriage is viewed as a partnership in which each
spouse plays an equal role in household decision making and
organization.2 8 This new ideal of marriage emerged during the
1960s, the same period that witnessed both wives' widespread
departure from the home into the wage labor force and the political
movement in favor of formal gender equality. 29
Today, a half-century after these economic and political
developments, wives have economic opportunities equal, at least
formally, to those of their husbands. Although women's salaries
continue to lag behind men's, the gap has narrowed substantially,
and, in a growing fraction of married-couple households, women
earn the larger share of family income.3 o In light of these
developments, a wife's decision to devote herself to unpaid
household labor may impose dollar losses on the household equal
to or greater than those which the husband's decision to engage in
unpaid labor would impose.
The new partnership ideal reflects not only these changed
economic realities, but also altered perceptions of marriage,
divorce, and family ties. During the 1960s and 1970s, most of the
industrialized world, common law and civil law nations alike,
instituted reforms that "emphasized the individuality of the
members of the conjugal family as well . . . facilitat[ing] their

independence from it and each other."31 The new reforms were

28. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or
Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1237-38 (2005) ("All fifty states are ....
guided, at least to some degree, by a partnership theory of marriage when
considering how to distribute property in the context of divorce, and most
scholars and advocates have come to take the theory for granted."); Alicia
Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth
Distributionat Divorce: In Recognition ofa SharedLife, 19 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
141 (2004). Cases utilizing partnership concepts to justify particular divorce
property awards are collected in Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable
DistributionDoctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4th 481 § 3 (1985 & Supp. 2009).
29. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (1963), quoted
in ROBERT J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 164 (1968) (urging that "[m]arriage is partnership to
which each spouse makes a different but equally important contribution").
30. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Wives Earning
More than Their Husbands, 1987-2006 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2009/jan/wkl/artO5.htm.
31. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 245
(1983).
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gender-neutral; they also emphasized-across a range of issuesthe autonomy of individuals instead of the family as a collective
entity. 32
So-called "no-fault" divorce, which augmented or replaced
traditional divorce predicated on a showing of matrimonial fault
with rules that permitted divorce based on a period of separation or
marital breakdown, was an important part of this reform package.3 3
Once divorce had been recast as a demand-based entitlement
instead of a fault-based remedy, alimony-the damage award that
the fault system had made available to a wronged and needy
wife-lost its conceptual basis.
Alimony critics-including many feminists and women's
advocates-. . . urged that the traditional emphasis on fault
and need in setting alimony awards perpetuated traditional
notions of women as dependents and failed to recognize the
value of a wife's contributions as a homemaker and parent.
With ever increasing numbers of women in the workplace,
the notion of lifetime spousal support also began to seem
anachronistic. 34
Additionally, alimony critics pointed out that, although the
alimony claim had theoretically been available to any wife whose
husband was at fault in causing the dissolution of the marriage,
empirical evidence showed that alimony was in fact seldom
awarded and even less frequently paid. Finally, they noted that,
when alimony was paid, it required ongoing contact between the
former spouses that perhaps encouraged conduct, such as postdivorce litigation, aimed at "punishing ...

past behavior [instead

of] beginning entirely new lives." 35
These various criticisms of alimony as a principal method of
redressing the economic hardship of divorce led commentators in
the common law jurisdictions to increasingly prefer property
32. Reforms in a diverse set of family law principles-abortion, divorce,
child custody, children's rights--can all be traced to this transformed view of
the family. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAw (1987); Marsha Garrison, Toward a ContractarianAccount of Family
Governance, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 241 (1998).
33. Today, no-fault divorce is available in virtually all jurisdictions,
typically without the consent of the spouses. In the United States, only two
states (Mississippi and Tennessee) currently restrict no-fault divorce to cases
involving spousal agreement. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (West, Westlaw
through 2010) (joint petition with separation agreement required); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-4-101(a)(15) (West, Westlaw through Jun. 2011) (separation
agreement required for couples with minor children).
34. Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 4, at 630.
35. LEVY, supra note 29, at 146.
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distribution to alimony as a divorce entitlement. "[I]f a system for
division of property between husband and wife upon divorce ...
were adopted and . .. the family has sufficient property to divide,"

they argued, "it would be possible to drastically reduce or
eliminate alimony as continued support for an ex-spouse." 6
Legislatures responded affirmatively; in enacting no-fault
divorce grounds, they typically recast alimony as a limited remedy
available, in most cases, only for a limited period and for
"rehabilitative'' purposes. In common law jurisdictions, legislatures
also typically enacted laws that permitted the distribution of
property to a spouse who did not hold title to the asset or expanded
judicial doctrines that permitted a court to distribute a husband's
property to a wife when the husband could not or would not pay
alimony or when an alimony award was insufficient to compensate
the wife for property she had brought into the marriage.3 7
Community property jurisdictions, of course, had already accepted
the idea of property entitlements growing out of marital status. In
these states and, over time, in the common law jurisdictions as
well, debate focused not on whether it was appropriate to divide
assets at divorce without regard to title, but on the method by
which those assets should be distributed.
B. How Should Assets Be Divided?
1. Discretion v. Rules
Most American jurisdictions adopted-and continue to
employ-the so-called "equitable distribution" approach to
property distribution, which relies heavily on judicial discretion to
achieve a fair outcome. Equitable distribution states typically grant
36. CITIZENS' ADvISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 8-9 (1968); see also LEVY, supra
note 29, at 144-47 (urging abolition of alimony except in special cases).
37. In the United States, twenty-two states, by either judicial decision or
legislation, gave judges discretionary power to award property to a non-titleholding spouse by 1938. See Harriet Spiller Daggett, Division of Property Upon
Dissolution of Marriage,6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 227 (1939) (citing 2
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS Supp. 60 (1938 Supp.)). These early property
distribution regimes were intended to augment alimony, however, not to provide a
property distribution entitlement. Statutes often required judges to transfer
property in the guise of an alimony payment and "[m]ost courts gave limited scope
to [property distribution principles] . . . , interpreting them merely to protect the

interests of a spouse who provided the capital to acquire a particular asset . . . ."
Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization,
Together with Criticism and Suggestionsfor Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 45, 72
(1981); see also CLARK, supranote 16 at 450.
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the decision-maker the capacity to award a spouse any portion of
the pool of distributable assets. For example, New York's statutory
scheme requires the judge to distribute assets "equitably between
the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the
respective parties."38 To determine what equity requires, the
legislature has provided a list of 13 different considerations that
together take account of spousal need, resources, contribution to
the marriage, and economic misconduct. 39 A catch-all clause
additionally permits consideration of "any other factor which the
court shall expressly find to be just and proper."40 In sum, the
statute directs the judge to base the distributional decision on an
appraisal of the parties' past conduct, present needs, and future life
circumstances, but leaves the scope, methodology, and application
of that appraisal to judicial discretion.4 1

38. N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236B(5)(c) (McKinney 2010).
39. The considerations provided for by the legislature are the following:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and
at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital
residence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the
marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the
marriage;
(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and
services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the
career or career potential of the other party;
(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or
any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic
desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any
claim or interference by the other party;
(11)the tax consequences to each party;
(12)the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a
matrimonial action without fair consideration;
(14) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney 2010).
40. Id. at § 236B(5)(d)(14).
41. Most equitable distribution laws employ lengthy factor lists like that
contained in the New York statute. For a comparison of state standards, see
OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 13.02.
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Not every jurisdiction adopted the equitable distribution
approach, however. A minority chose to require equal distribution
of divisible assets or created a presumption in favor of equal
distribution.4 2 In the United States, only seven states currently
employ an equal division or presumption-of-equal-division
approach,43 but these states include California, one of the most
populous in the country, and the ALI has argued that equal division
is appropriate except in very limited situations:
Equal division offers a rough compromise between the
competing claims of contribution and need .

...

The equal-

division rule typically provides that spouse more than he or
she contributed financially, but less than a need-based rule
might provide, depending upon the definition of need.
The equal-division rule also follows from the sharing
premise that necessarily underlies the choice of a marital ...
property system. . . . [E]quality . . . is the rule of the

partnership model to which analogy is frequently made.
Once the principle that both spouses have claims to the
marital property is accepted, dividing that property equally
between them is the allocation that least requires
justification."
The ALI assumes that a "compromise between the competing
claims of contribution and need'4 5 is best because it is consistent
42. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West Supp. 2011) (equal division);
§ 9-12-315 (West Supp. 2011) (rebuttable presumption of
equal division).
43. Under the Principles, "[t]he spouses are allocated net shares of the
marital property or debts that are unequal in value if, and only if, one or more of
the following is true":
(a) Pursuant to § 5.10, § 5.11, or § 5.14, the court compensates a spouse
for a loss recognized in Chapter 5, in whole or in part, with an
enhanced share of the marital property.
(b) Pursuant to § 4.10, the court allows one spouse an enhanced share
of the marital property because the other spouse previously made an
improper disposition of some portion of it.
(c) Marital debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to
assign the excess debt unequally, because of a significant disparity in
the spouses' financial capacity, their participation in the decision to
incur the debt, or their consumption of the goods or services that the
debt was incurred to acquire.
(d) Debt has been incurred to finance a spouse's education, in which
case it is treated as the separate obligation of the spouse whose
education it financed.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 4.09(2).
44. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 4.09 cmt. b.
45. Id.

ARK. STAT. ANN.
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with an equality principle. But, the ALI stops short of
recommending equal division in all cases because "[i]t is . . .
impossible to draft reasonable rules that unambiguously resolve
every factual variation. .. . [N]o formulation can eliminate all need
for judicial discretion."
In formulating a distributional model, every lawmaker faces
similar choices between individualized and rule-based results. The
choice between equal and equitable distribution thus involves a
methodological issue: is it better to pursue fairness on an
individualized, discretionary basis, looking at the facts of each and
every marriage, or is it better to rely on a bright-line rule that will,
of necessity, treat very different couples in the same way?
2. EvaluatingDiscretionandRules
Legislatures have not unanimously favored discretion or rules
because each approach entails unavoidable disadvantages.
Discretion breeds uncertainty; rules produce inflexibility.
The uncertainty inherent in discretionary standards enhances
the possibility of inconsistency; such standards inevitably
"increase the likelihood that characteristics of the judge, the court,
or the community may affect case outcome." 47 Inconsistent results
are undesirable because like cases fail to receive like treatment.
In addition to this obvious downside, inconsistent results can
impede settlement. Divorcing couples reach-or fail to reachagreement by bargaining "in the shadow of the law": their
negotiations are informed by their understanding of a likely
resolution were the case to go to trial.48 But when legal rules are
highly discretionary and imprecise, they cast a blurred shadow that
impairs each spouse's ability to understand his or her legal
entitlements and-perhaps even more important-to reach a
mutual understanding about those entitlements. Instead of
46. Id. at § 4.09 cmt. a.

47. See generally KENNETH C. DAvIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3-26, 5296, 215-33 (1969) (discussing potential for injustice when decision-maker
possesses extensive discretion). For empirical evidence on the impact of
nonlegal factors on custody decision-making at divorce, see Garrison, Empirical
Analysis of DiscretionaryDecision Making, supra note 4, at 401 (reporting that
political party of judge was significant factor in determining likelihood of
permanent alimony); Jessica Pearson & Maria Ring, JudicialDecision-Making
in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703 (1982-83) (reporting that
younger judges in urban areas were more likely to award custody to fathers than
were older judges in rural locations).
48. The classic account of divorce bargaining is contained in Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case
ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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consensus on case outcome, each litigant may reach very different
expectations, thus exacerbating the difficulty of forging a
negotiated settlement and increasing the likelihood of litigation."9
Discretionary standards also make divorcing couples dependent
upon the expertise of lawyers or other experts in assessing their
litigation prospects.5 0 Such experts may be able to offer litigants
information about likely case outcome, but consulting such experts
takes time and money. In the early 1990s, curious about just what
it would cost a typical couple-let us call them Mr. and Mrs.
Smith-to obtain a no-frills divorce, I had a law student call ten
different law firms listing divorce as a specialty in the Brooklyn,
Manhattan, and Queens yellow pages. The student asked each
firm's representative the likely cost of representing the Smiths in
an uncontested divorce and told the firm's representative that the
Smiths had been married for five years, were childless, and owned
no property except a joint bank account, a car, furniture, and a
jointly owned condominium apartment which would be sold, with
an equal division of the proceeds. Estimates to handle the Smiths'
divorce "ranged from $469 to $1,770; the mean was $931 .,,5 1 For a
divorce litigant like Mr. or Mrs. Smith, the price of legal
representation may well exceed any loss in post-divorce
entitlements that lawyer representation could have averted.5 2
49. Most litigation models suggest a higher litigation rate when the law is
uncertain. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 109293 (1989); George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. L. EcoN. & ORG.
193 (1987); see also Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Conflict in Divorce
Disputes: Determinants of PretrialSettlement, 21 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 157,
176 (2001) (testing predictions of various litigation models in a sample of
divorce cases and concluding that "the results suggest that the more uncertainty
about the outcome, the more likely a couple goes to court.").
50. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 979 (under
uncertain standard "a lawyer may be necessary simply for a person to learn what
his bargaining chips are."). For descriptions of the lawyer's role in the
settlement process, see Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participationand Flexibility
in Informal Processes: Cautionsfrom the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 585, 598-602 (1987); Marygold Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation:
An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1988); Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26
LAW & Soc'y REV. 565 (1992); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers
and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE
L.J. 1663 (1989); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in
the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93 (1986).
51. See Garrison,supra note 47, at 516 n.387.
52. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571 (1992) ("Individuals acting in their self-interest
will acquire such [legal] advice only if its perceived value exceeds its perceived
cost."). Researchers thus report that self-representation at divorce is significantly
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Discretionary standards also make it difficult for a divorce
litigant to judge whether his or her attorney has negotiated a good
deal or a bad one. Indeed, the attorney herself may not know
whether she has negotiated a good or bad deal; her capacity to
judge success will of necessity be confined to what she learns from
reported cases, her own practice experience, and her observations.
And, if the reported cases fail to reveal clear and consistent
patterns, her own limited set of cases and observations will offer
the only "norm" available, a norm that may be normal nowhere
else.
In sum, discretion can impede settlement, increase costs, and
enhance the likelihood of litigation. Instead of the finely nuanced,
individualized outcomes that discretionary standards aim to
produce, discretion may produce results that are arbitrary and
inconsistent.
Rules, of course, also entail risks. The most obvious of these is
inflexibility. Hard and fast rules work well where there is broad
consensus on the right results in easily definable case categories.
But, where consensus is lacking or where the boundaries between
case categories are blurred, the price of certainty may well be
inequity.
Consider, for example, criminal-sentencing reform. Until the
1980s, sentencing was highly discretionary; the judge imposing a
penalty was expected to consider a broad range of factors-the
severity of the crime, past criminal conduct, the defendant's
circumstances and potential for reform-and make an
individualized judgment of fairness, akin to that expected in the
divorce court. Guidelines that introduced black-letter rules into the
sentencing process were adopted because of the growing
perception that discretionary sentencing produced inconsistency
instead of individualized tailoring. But, the result of reform was a
new wave of criticism suggesting the cure was worse than the
problem. To many observers, sentences under the new guidelines
were more predictable, but less fair.5 3

correlated with income, age, whether the marriage produced children, propertyownership, and marital duration. See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is SelfRepresentationa Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce
Cases?, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 553, 561-66 (1993); Project, The Unauthorized
Practiceof Law and Pro Se Divorce: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104,
162 (1976) (divorce litigants without children and with short marriages were
more likely to self-represent).
53. See Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing,
458 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2002) ("In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee

received testimony from 270 witnesses-including judges, prosecutors, defense
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Can property-division rules be fashioned that categorize cases
in a way that promotes fairness as well as predictability? The
ALI's claim that "dividing . . . property equally between [the

spouses] is the allocation that least requires justification" 54
assumes that individually tailored property awards are neither a
necessary nor a desirable goal of divorce law. And probate lawwhich determines spousal entitlements at death-does, at least in
the United States, rely exclusively on bright-line rules. Under both
community property and common law elective share rules, the
surviving spouse's entitlement is fixed and unvarying.5 5 Individual
circumstances such as need, resources, marital contribution and
fault are irrelevant to case outcome. The surviving spouse's
fractional share of the decedent's assets is specified with finality
by the legislature, as is the asset pool to which that fraction will
apply. U.S. probate law thus strives for certainty at the expense of
individualized equity.
Outside the United States, however, probate law is not
invariably rule-bound. In the U.K. and most other common law
nations, so-called "family maintenance" statutes allow the probate
judge to revise a decedent spouse's will, and even legislatively
defined intestate shares, in order to equitably Rrovide for the
decedent's surviving spouse and other dependents.
Divorce law and probate law also have very different histories.
Probate law derives from property law; its primary goal has been
the delineation of mechanisms for the orderly transmission of
wealth. Probate law's quest for certainty thus reflects its focus on
the protection and clarification of rights.

attorneys, probation officers, and federal officials-and only four people
expressed support for the Guidelines: the U.S. Attorney General and three
members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Surveys of the judiciary have
confirmed widespread disapproval of the Guidelines: A 1992 poll found that more
than half of all federal judges believe the current system should be completely
eliminated, while a 1997 survey concluded that more than two-thirds of federal
judges view the Guidelines as unnecessary."); see also Frank 0. Bowman III, The
Failureof the FederalSentencing Guidelines: A StructuralAnalysis, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1315 (2005).
54. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 4.09 cmt. b.
55. For a description and comparison of spousal entitlements at death under
community property and common law rules, see, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 469-76.
56. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 521-22; Michelle Harris, Why
a Limited Family Maintenance System Could Help American "Grandfamilies", 3
NAELA STUDENT J. 239 (2007).
57. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577, 577 (1988) (describing fixed rules as "the very stuff of property: their
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The ALI can today envision a probate-based system of divorce
property distribution because modem divorce law has shifted away
from its traditional goal of remedial, fault-based justice. The most
obvious example of this trend is the advent of "no-fault" divorce,
described in the last section. In a growing number of U.S. and
European jurisdictions, the role of fault has also been dramatically
curtailed in the determination of alimony and in property
division.
However, the shift away from fault-based divorce law has in
fact tended to produce discretionary standards rather than brightline rules like those envisioned by the ALL. A major reason for this
result is that the consensus in favor of no-fault divorce has not
individual
by consensus regarding
been accompanied
responsibility and marital obligation. Instead, competing visions of
family, gender, and individual responsibility have pulled in
different directions, producing highly discretionary standards that
demand consideration of wildly disparate values.
Nor is it obvious that probate law and divorce law should rely
on the same concept of fairness or employ similar methods of
determination. Probate law applies when a marriage has survived,
intact, until the death of one spouse. Needless to say, the decedent
spouse has neither future needs nor the capacity to enjoy his or her
assets. Asset division thus does not pit two spouses with different
interests against each other, but instead pits the surviving spouse
against other individuals whom the decedent spouse wanted to
benefit. The minimum-entitlement principles that probate law
utilizes to protect surviving spouses against disinheritance also
applies against a different pattern of expectations. Survey evidence
shows that, except when one or both spouses is genuinely wealthy
or has had children with other partners, the overwhelming majority
of married men and women want their surviving spouse to inherit
everything; a surviving spouse thus will quite reasonably expect to

great advantage, or so it is commonly thought, is that they signal to all of us, in a
clear and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may
take care of our interests.").
58. The states are about equally divided on whether fault is relevant to an
alimony award. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year
in Family Law: "Same-Sex" Marriage Issue Dominates Headlines, 38 FAM.
L.Q. 777, 809, chart 1 (2005). In a number of states, marital fault other than
dissolution of marital assets may not be considered in property division. In other
states, marital fault may be considered by the decision-maker only when
egregious. See OLDHAM, supranote 10, § 13.02[l][a](describing state rules).
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receive the lion's share of the decedent spouse's estate. 59 Divorce
law, by contrast, applies when both spouses expect to build new
lives without the other. It is far from obvious that the general
public or married couples view fairness in the divorce court and
the probate court in identical terms.
II. CHOOSING A MODEL
We have seen that marital property regimes have historically
reflected both marital ideals and economic realities. We have also
seen that both patriarchy and the "separate sphere" conception of
spousal relations have given way to a partnership model of
marriage. The new partnership ideal reflects the realities of formal
gender equality and increased economic opportunities for women.
It also reflects and reinforces both an ethic of spousal sharing and a
new vision of spouses as autonomous individuals who can freely
exit a dysfunctional relationship.
When average citizens, married or single, talk about marriage,
they tend to do so in terms of sharing. 60 "Many [married couples]
speak of sharing-thoughts, feelings, tasks, values, or life goalsas the greatest virtue in a relationship." 6' Reflecting this sharing
ethic, married couples all over the world overwhelmingly report
that they share economic resources and that such sharing is a
product of love, trust, and commitment. 62
59. See Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 319, 348-64 (1978); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and
Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 251-53
(1963); John R. Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community
Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L. REv. 277, 311-13 (1975); Project, A
Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected provisions of the
Iowa and Uniform ProbateCodes, 63 IOWA L. REv. 1041 (1978).
60. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 90 (1985) (96% of Americans valued "the
ideal of two people sharing a life and a home together").
61. Id. at 91.
62. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 101,
110 (1983) (reporting that only 12% of surveyed wives and 8% of surveyed
husbands strongly disagreed that couples should pool everything); JAN PAHL,
MONEY AND MARRIAGE 77-78, 83, 126-27 (1989) (reporting, based on study of
102 married couples in the U.K., that spouses see income-sharing as the norm,
widely share income, and that, within research sample, couples forgoing pooling
were too infrequent to include in analysis); JANET STOCKS ET AL., MODERN
COUPLES: SHARING MONEY, SHARING LIFE 11, 16-17, 49 (2007) (finding that a
majority of couples view sharing resources as natural, describing different
pooling systems used by married couples: wife-managed, husband-managed,
jointly managed, and independently managed, and finding that a jointly
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But what does marital sharing mean at divorce? Clearly, the
experts do not agree: how should we choose a fairness model?
One obvious method is to consult the public. Survey data have
played an important part in triggering reforms in the law of
intestate distribution because the aim of this body of law is to meet
the expectations of typical citizens. Divorce law shares this
emphasis on meeting expectations. Moreover,
[flor any law strongly related to societal values . . . , policy-

makers need to have an accurate portrayal of current
cultural norms and sentiments.

...

[P]olicymakers ought to

be concerned about maintaining rules that conflict with lay
intuitions about what is right, for they may lead to general
disdain for the court or the rule-makers .6.. 3
The "convenience" samples whose views are shown here are
not ideal vehicles for revealing public opinion. All of the
respondents are first-year law students at Brooklyn Law School,
Sha'arei Mishpat, or the Hebrew University in Israel.6 4 While this
group is an excellent cohort to provide data on the views of the
well-educated young, few of the respondents had themselves been
married or had children. We do not know if their views are
representative of the general population. However, the sample does
provide an opportunity to assess perspectives on fairness within an
important population segment and to do so cross-nationally. 6 5

managed pool is the majority practice, while independent-management system is
used by a only small portion of couples); Judith Treas, Money in the Bank:
Transaction Costs and the Economic Organization of Marriage, 58 AM, Soc.
REV. 723 (1993) (finding that 95% of married couples pool assets, although
sometimes not all assets).
63. Sanford L. Braver et al., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After
Divorce, 17 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y & L 212, 215 (2011).
64. I am indebted to Dr. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat of Shar'arei Mishpat
College, Hod Hasharon, Israel for administering the survey to first-year students
at Shar'arei Mishpat and the Hebrew University.
65. Israeli marriage and divorce law differs from U.S. family law in
important ways. Marriage, divorce and (with some exceptions) spousal support
are governed by religious law; thus, no-fault divorce is unavailable and postdivorce spousal support is rare. Property distribution is governed by secular law.
However, there are two different property regimes. Until 1974, Israeli law relied
on something like a community of acquests model although, for marriages of
long duration (about 30 years), a presumption of co-ownership was sometimes
applied to premarital assets. The Spouse (Property Relations) Law applies to
couples who married after 1974. Under the statute, premarital assets and assets
acquired by gift, descent, and devise are never distributable at divorce. The law
presumes equal division but permits the court to deviate from a 50-50 split.
However, there was no case law interpreting the statute until 2008; the law
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Survey respondents were asked to identify which factors
should be considered in dividing property at divorce. They were
also asked whether the division of assets should be rule-based or
discretionary. The heart of the survey, however, involved decision
making about four individual cases. For each case, respondents
were asked to determine what assets were available for distribution
and the percentage distribution of both individual assets and the
total pool of assets. Finally, respondents were asked whether their
decision would change if the higher-income spouse were required
to pay spousal support to the lower-income spouse.
The four cases were chosen both to test notions of fairness with
respect to the definition of divisible property and the divisional
principles that should be applied. Case One involved a long-term
marriage in which the wife, with her husband's approval, had
given up a valuable career in order to act as a full-time mother and
homemaker:
Case One (Homemaker Wife, ProfessionalHusband)
Herb and Willa have been married for 16 years. Both are
now 46 years old. They have three children aged 15, 12, and 8
years. Both Herb and Willa are accountants. Until the birth of
their first child, Willa earned approximately the same salary as
Herb; indeed, in one year she earned more. After the birth of
their first child, Willa began working a four-day week, while
Herb became a partner at a global accounting firm. Shortly
before the birth of their second child, Herb and Willa agreed
that Willa should focus on providing full-time care for the
children and that Herb should focus on being the family
breadwinner.
Herb earned $1,500,000 last year; Willa earned nothing.
Herb, Willa, and their three children are all in good health.
All of Herb's and Willa's assets were acquired during their
marriage.

applied only to formal divorces and, under Jewish divorce law, a divorce (get)
requires the consent of both parties. A statutory amendment enacted in 2008
permits courts to distribute property prior to a formal divorce. Courts are thus
beginning to develop case law on the factors that justify deviation from an equal
asset division. The Supreme Court has already held that non-economic
misconduct (i.e., adultery) does not justify an unequal distribution. I am
indebted to Professor Ayelet Blecher-Prigat for this description of Israeli law.
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Case Two involved a short, childless marriage in which one
spouse had acquired considerable wealth both before and during
the marriage.
Case Two (Short Marriage,Husbandwith PremaritalWealth)
Henry and Wilma have been married for two years. Henry
is 39 years old and Wilma is 33. They have no children. Both
are in good health. Henry is an investment banker; his current
salary is $350,000 per year. Henry also receives annual
bonuses; last year's bonus was $2.5 million, and his bonus the
year before that was $6 million. Since her marriage to Henry,
Wilma has not been employed. Before marriage, Wilma earned
$75,000 per year as a public relations officer.
Case Three involved a long-term marriage with a wife who has
made virtually all the economic and noneconomic contributions to
the marriage.
Case Three (HardworkingWife, DeadbeatHusband)
Hank and Wendy have been married for 20 years. They
have no children. Hank is 49 years old, and Wendy is 47. Both
are in good health.
Hank has been employed in various positions during the
marriage. He is currently employed as a truck driver and earns
$32,000 per year. He is also qualified as a carpenter,
electrician, plumber, and an auto body repairperson. Hank has
lost approximately 14 jobs during the marriage. Any money
that he has earned, Hank has spent on personal items such as
motorcycles, handguns, and hunting and fishing equipment.
Wendy is employed in an administrative capacity and earns
$40,000 per year. Wendy has paid all household bills from her
salary and has sometimes worked at two or three jobs to do so.
Case Four involved a long-term marriage between two
professionals in which the husband, who earned less than his wife,
had foregone making pension contributions because of inherited
wealth.
Case Four (Long Marriage,Husbandwith Inheritance)
Hal and Wanda have been married for 30 years and have
two children, both in their early twenties. Hal is 65 years old,
and Wanda is 60. Both are in good health.
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Both Hal and Wanda are physicians and, at the time of their
marriage, both earned comparable salaries. Wanda has
consistently worked full-time, and for the past 15 years, she has
earned two-thirds to three-quarters of the family income.
Wanda has also, at all times, been the primary caretaker of the
children and the primary homemaker. Hal worked full time
until last year, when he retired. He currently receives $30,000
per year in pension benefits; Wanda currently earns $200,000
per year.
All of these cases tested respondents' notions of fairness in
the distribution of assets. Cases Two and Four additionally
tested the definition of divisible property; both involved assets
that would be indivisible using a community of acquests
model:
Case Two (two-year marriage)
Henry and Wilma own the following asset acquired during
their marriage:
* The marital home, owned jointly, valued at $500,000.
Henry and Wilma own the following assets acquired before
their marriage:
* Shares in the hedge fund that Henry manages, owned by
Henry. Henry purchased the stock before marriage to
Wilma for $5 million. It was worth about $10 million
when Henry and Wilma married and it is worth about
$20 million now.
* Shares in the investment firm where Henry is a partner,
owned by Henry. Henry received some of these shares as
bonuses and purchased others for a total of $2 million.
Because Henry's firm is not a publicly traded company,
it is unclear how much these shares are worth. Estimates
range from $5 million to $15 million.
* Wilma's pension, owned by Wilma. It was worth
$50,000 when Henry and Wilma married. It is worth
$60,000 now.
Case Four (30-year marriage)
Hal and Wanda own the following assets, all acquired
during their marriage:
* The marital home, owned jointly, valued at $500,000,
* Wanda's pension, owned by Wanda, worth $1 million,
* Hal's pension, owned by Hal, worth $100,000.
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Hal and Wanda own the following assets acquired
before their marriage:
* A stock portfolio, owned by Hal, that he inherited from
his grandmother. The portfolio was worth $300,000
when Hal and Wanda married, and it is worth $1.5
million now. Hal made few pension contributions
during the marriage because he viewed this inheritance
as a retirement nest egg.
For each listed asset, respondents were asked to specify
whether:
a) This asset's full value is divisible
b) Some portion of this asset's full value is divisible
c) This asset is nondivisible
If respondents viewed fairness in terms of universal
community, then in both Case Two and Four, they should have
reported that the full value of each asset was divisible. If they
viewed fairness in terms of a community of acquests model, then
they should have reported, in both cases, that only assets acquired
during marriage through marital effort were divisible; all
nonmarital assets should have been classified as altogether
nondivisible. If they favored something like the ALI accrual
model, they should have said that no or only a small fraction of
nonmarital property was divisible in Case Two (two-year
marriage) but that all was divisible in Case Four (30-year
marriage).
*

Here are the actual results:
Table 1:
Divisibility of Assets at Divorce (Cases Two & Four), by Asset
and Respondent Nationality

Asset
2. H premaritalhedge fund shares
Asset's full value is divisible
Some portion of asset's full value is
divisible
Asset is nondivisible
2. Hpremaritalinvestment shares

U.S.
Israeli
Respondents Respondents
N=277
N=195
7%
12%
42%
47%
52%
N=280

42%
n=192

10%
41%

15%
47%

(hardto value)

Asset's full value is divisible
Some portion of asset's full value is
divisible
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2. Wpremaritalpension
Asset's full value is divisible
Some portion of asset's full value is
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Israeli
U.S.
Respondents Respondents
49%
38%
N=278
N=192
15%
06%
27%
28%

divisible

Asset is nondivisible
4: H inheritance
Asset's full value is divisible
Some portion of asset's full value is

67%
N=259
10%
46%

57%
N=171
15%
42%

44%

44%

divisible

Asset is nondivisible

Several things stand out here. One is the respondents' apparent
rejection of the ALI accrual model. Among the U.S. respondents,
only 7% viewed the husband's premarital stock holdings as
divisible in the context of a two-year marriage (Case Two), and
only 10% viewed the husband's inherited stock holdings as
divisible in the context of a 30-year marriage (Case Four); among
the Israeli respondents, 12% viewed the husband's premarital stock
holdings as fully divisible in a two-year marriage (Case Two), and
only 15% viewed the husband's inherited stock holdings as
divisible in a 30-year marriage (Case Four). The similarity of these
results is particularly striking given that the fact pattern specified,
in the case of the 30-year marriage, that the husband had "made
few pension contributions during the marriage because he viewed
this inheritance as a retirement nest egg." Equally notable is the
respondents' lack of consensus with respect to either universal
community or the community of acquests model. For each asset,
respondents were highly unlikely to report that the asset was fully
divisible (universal community rejected). However, for each asset,
except the wife's premarital pension in Case Two, more than 40%
of both U.S. and Israeli respondents indicated that some portion of
the asset should be divisible (community of acquests rejected).66 In
sum, the most striking thing about the results is that none of the
dominant models was, in these cases, a winner. Indeed, the relative
enthusiasm for the "some portion of this asset is divisible" option
suggests that many respondents were torn between the all-ornothing approaches at either end of the spectrum.

66. None of the differences between the U.S. and Israeli distributional
patterns were significant at the .05 confidence level.
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Respondents were also ambivalent about one particular type of
asset-pensions. Even when a pension was fully accrued during the
marriage, respondents were much less likely to say that a pension
was fully divisible than they were other, more traditional assets.
Table 2:
Percentage of Respondents Reporting Marital Assets as Fully
Divisible, by Asset & Respondent Nationality
Israeli
U.S.
Asset
1: Marital home
1. Vacation home
1. H pension
3. Marital home
3. Bank account
3. W pension
4. Marital home
4. W pension
4. H pension

Respondents

Respondents

91%
89%
34%
55%
52%
12%
77%
18%
16%

94%
91%
33%
65%
56%
15%
80%
26%*
26%**

*p <.06

For all three of these cases, the pension gap is enormous, and this
difference is consistent across national boundaries.
What is also notable looking across these three cases is the
large, case-based variation in the proportion of respondents who
describe the same type of asset as fully divisible. For pensions,
three times as many respondents were willing to consider both the
husband's and the wife's pensions as divisible in Case Four as
compared to Case Three. Even with the marital home (in all cases
jointly owned), more than 90% of respondents viewed this asset as
fully divisible in Case One, as compared to only 55% of U.S. and
65% of Israeli respondents in Case Three. What seems to account
for these differences is a sense of the underlying equities. Case
Three is that of the hardworking wife and deadbeat husband; Case
One involves the homemaker spouse and professional husband.
Rather than relying solely on divisional principles, some of the
respondents seem prepared to use equity as a basis for identifying
which property should be initially treated as divisible.
In sum, the best summary of respondents' views on the
definition of divisible property is that it is highly individualized. No
single definition commands clear support. Instead, individualized
decision making is apparent even at the definitional stage.
It is also notable that these general trends applied across
national boundaries. Although the Israeli respondents were, in
general, more likely than U.S. respondents to describe both marital
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and non-marital assets as divisible, the pattern of case-based and
asset-based variation is quite consistent across these two cohorts.
Definitional variability was matched, unsurprisingly, by
variation in the percentage of assets awarded to each spouse across
cases. Respondents did not, at least in their case-based decision
making, favor a bright-line rule that applied across cases.
Table 3:
Distribution of Assets (Marital and Total), by Respondent
Nation lity
Israeli
U.S.
Total Asset Distribution,
Respondents Respondents
by Case
Case 1: What percentage of all
(n=195)
(N=285)
assets acquired during the
marriage should be awarded to
the husband, Herb?
4%
1%
less than 25%
14%
6%
26-44%
74%
74%
45-54%
5%
18%
55%-74%
1%
1%
75% or more
Case 2: What percentage of all
(n=193)
(N=279)
assets acquiredduring the
marriageshould be awarded to
the husband, Henry?

less than 25%
26-44%
45-54%
55-74%
75% or more
Case 3: What percentage of all
assets acquiredduring the
marriageshould be awarded to

2%
4%
56%
28%
10%

2%
8%
63%
17%
9%

(N=279)

(N=189)

25%
39%
34%
0%
0%

17%
34%
43%
1%
1%

(N=274)

(N=178)

the husband, Hank?

less than 25%
26-44%
45-54%
55-74%
75% or more
Case 4: What percentage of all
assets acquiredduring the
marriageshould be awarded to
the husband, Hal?
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Total Asset Distribution,
by Case
less than 25%
26-44%
45-54%
55-74%
75% or more

U.S.
Respondents
4%
24%
70%
0%
2%

Israeli
Respondents
4%
25%
67%
5%
2%

Case Three, that of the hardworking wife and deadbeat husband,
stands out here: only 34% of U.S. and 43% of Israeli respondents
thought the husband should receive a relatively equal share of assets,
and none thought he should receive the larger share. By contrast,
almost three-quarters (74%) of U.S. and Israeli respondents divided
assets relatively equally in Case One (professional husband,
homemaker wife), and at least two-thirds did so in Case Four
(professional couple, husband with inheritance).
The survey responses also showed case-based differences in
respondents' views of the role that alimony should play in
determining property outcomes, and these were also quite
consistent across national boundaries. In Case One, 50% of U.S.
and 41% of Israeli respondents answered yes in response to the
question "If the divorce decree required Herb to pay post-divorce
spousal support to Willa, would you award Herb a larger
percentage of the couple's assets?" By contrast, 59% of U.S. and
58% of Israeli respondents said the wife in Case Four should
receive more property if she were required to pay post-divorce
support to her husband, and 67% of U.S. and 65% of Israeli
respondents agreed the wife in Case Three should receive more
property in such circumstances.6 7
Gender differences in distributional patterns were not
consistent across the four cases. In Case One, 82% of U.S. female
and 63% of U.S. male respondents divided assets relatively
equally, a difference significant at the .01 confidence level.
However, more men than women awarded the wife a larger-thanequal share, with the result that outcome variation declined
substantially looking at the proportion of respondents who awarded
the wife a relatively equal or larger share of assets (90% men, 96%
women). In the remaining cases, gender differences in
distributional patterns were relatively, perhaps surprisingly, slight.

67. 53% of U.S. and 40% of Israeli respondents reported that the Case Two
Husband should receive more property if he were required to pay spousal
support.
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The case-based results were largely mirrored in the responses
to the question "What factors should be taken into account in the
division of property at divorce?" More than 90% of all respondents
indicated that both the needs and interests of the couple's children
should be considered. U.S. respondents were far more likely to list
other considerations. Cross-national variation is particularly
evident for economic and noneconomic misconduct, a result that
explains the Israeli respondents significantly greater adherence to
an equal division norm.
Table 4:
What factors should be taken into account in divorce property
distribution?
Israeli
U.S.
Factor
Respondents Respondents
Each spouse's economic
89%
78%
contributions to the marriage
Each spouse's noneconomic
84%
75%
contributions to the marriage
Needs and interests of children
96%
91%
of the marriage
Each spouse's economic needs
72%
68%
Each spouse's economic
77%*
50%
misconduct**
Each spouse's noneconomic
64%
47%
misconduct

*p <.001, **p < .01
For all respondents, however, contribution clearly outweighs
need as a distributional consideration, except for the needs of the
couple's children. Contribution also outweighs misconduct,
although close to two-thirds of U.S. and almost half of Israeli
respondents felt noneconomic misconduct should be taken into
account.
In sum, the respondents' choices, both with respect to the cases
themselves and their responses to general decision making factors,
suggests a preference for a divisional approach that results in equal
division in typical cases, but preserves some level of individualized
decision making (although the Israeli respondents were more likely
to adhere to equal division than were the Americans). And when
confronted with the general choice between rules and discretion,
the respondents did indeed vote against bright line rules. At the end
of the survey, respondents were asked to respond to this statement:
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Property division may be legislatively determined by fixed
rules (e.g., each spouse receives 50% of all assets or each
spouse receives those assets to which he or she has title),
judicially determined by an apprisal of the facts of each
case (e.g., each spouse receives a "fair" share of all assets,
based on consideration of the specifics of this marriage), or
determined based on a hybrid approach (e.g., in most cases,
each spouse should receive those assets to which he or she
holds title, but a judge may deviate from that outcome if
extreme hardship would result from this outcome). Which
approach is best?
Only 2% of U.S. and 3% of Israeli respondents chose
legislative determination as the best approach. Thirteen percent of
U.S. and 20% of Israeli respondents chose individualized
determination, and 43% of U.S. and 40% of Israeli respondents
selected a hybrid approach. But the respondents clearly thought
this question was difficult; 42% of U.S. and 38% of Israeli
respondents simply didn't answer it. Thus, while a hybrid approach
that combined legislative and judicial judgment received by far the
most support, we cannot say it achieved even a majority vote.
We cannot make too much of these results, of course. The
sample does not represent the general population. Perhaps equally
problematic, the results represent only a "first-time," off-the-cuff
response to the problems of divorce property division. For
questions of justice, there is much to be said for an approach that I
have elsewhere described as interpretive. The interpretive
approach, which bears a strong resemblance to the traditional
process of analogical reasoning engaged in by common-law
both concrete cases and "specific
judges, relies on an analysis,,6of
8
11 1
dl
policies.
and
legal principles
One or another variant of the interpretive methodology has
"found favor with several groups charged with developing policy
in areas where feelings run high, but consensus on general
principles is lacking":
For example, a commission appointed by the federal
government to develop guidelines for criminal sentencing
ultimately rejected reliance on both high theory and
intuition in favor of an approach based heavily on past
practice. The Commission considered the possibility of
devising guidelines based on a deterrence model of
68. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REV. 835,
873 (2000).
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punishment; it also considered guidelines based on a "just
desserts" principle: "Why didn't the Commission sit down
and really go and rationalize this thing and not just take
history?" In the words of the Commission's chairperson,
"We couldn't. We couldn't because there are such good
arguments ... pointing in opposite directions."
The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research similarly
found that "the one thing [on which its members] could not
agree . . . was why they agreed. . . Instead of securely

established universal principles, . . . [t]he locus of certitude
in the commissioners' discussions . . . lay in a shared

perception of what was specifically at stake in particular
kinds of human situations." In contrast to the Sentencing
Commission, this group did not eschew reliance on
principles altogether. Instead, "transcripts of the
Committee's deliberations show a constant back-and-forth
movement from principle to case and from case to
principle. . . ." The principles relied on by the group were

not, however, broad ethical theories, but the more mundane
and specific principles employed by bioethicists in
resolving individual cases. 69
The problems inherent in divorce property distribution are not
unlike those of criminal sentencing and biomedical ethics. All of
these areas involve messy judgments that must take account of an
array of competing goals and values. All of them involve decisions
that will affect the lives and well-being of individuals. And
certainly both criminal sentencing and divorce property
distribution share a tendency to look both backward and forward,
to assess both individual contributions and needs.
A logical next step is thus to use the same cases and principles
given to respondents in convenience samples to smaller groups
who would sit and discuss the cases with the aim of using the case
facts and general principles to produce decision-making principles.
This new research should, ideally, be conducted both with a
population like that in my initial research cohort and cohorts that
better reflect the general population. With repeated experiments,
we may well come closer to answering the elusive question:
What's fair in divorce property distribution?

69. Id. at 875-76.

